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THE SEVEN YEAR ITCH: IS IT TIME TO
REAMEND RULE 11?
I. INTRODUCTION
Seven years ago, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules amended
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 111 to combat the widespread overuse,
1. The text below shows the additions and deletions effected by the 1983 amend-
ment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (italics show additions, brackets show
deletions):
Rule 11. Signing of Pleadings, Motions and Other Papers; Sanctions
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attorney
shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose
address shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign
his pleading, motion, or other paper, and state his address. Except when otherwise
specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompa-
nied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of an answer under oath
must be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or of one witness sustained by
corroborating circumstances is abolished. The signature of an attorney or party
constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion, or other
paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief [there is good
ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay] formed after reasonable
inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is
not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other
paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission
is called to the attention of the pleader or movant. [or is signed with intent to defeat
the purpose of this rule; it may be stricken as sham and false and the action may
proceed as though the pleading had not been served. For a willful violation of this
rule an attorney may be subjected to appropriate disciplinary action. Similar ac-
tion may be taken if scandalous or indecent matter is inserted.] If a pleading, mo-
tion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon
its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or
both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party
or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the
pleading motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
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misuse and abuse of the litigation process.2 Adding bite to the rarely
used Rule, the Committee attempted to reduce frivolous lawsuit filings
by inducing courts to impose sanctions when violations occur.3
Although it was not expected to cure all the problems inherent in the
judicial system, the amendment redressed many concerns.4 Its impact
on the litigation process is clearly manifested by the significant increase
in the number of reported decisions applying the amended Rule.5
The Supreme Court recently spoke for the first time on revised Rule
11.6 Experts predict more cases will reach the Court in the near fu-
FED. R. Civ. P. 11, reprinted in 2A J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, MOORE's FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE 11.01[3] (2d ed. 1984).
2. See Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11-A Closer Look, 104
F.R.D. 181 (1985) [hereinafter Schwarzer, Sanctions]. Judge Schwarzer examines the
policy considerations underlying Rule 11, as well as its substantive provisions, the pro-
cedural implications of imposing sanctions, and the available sanctioning alternatives
such as disbarment, temporary disbarment, or referral to the state bar. See also
Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1013 (1988) [hereinafter Schwarzer,
Revisited]. Judge Schwarzer reexamines Rule 11 five years after its amendment, focus-
ing on the major problems with the operation of the Rule and proposals for more effec-
tive and less costly approaches to enforcing the Rule.
3. 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL
§ 1334 (1969) (The original rule imposed a virtually unenforceable obligation on the
attorney to certify that the action or defense was supported by good grounds). See also
Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11-Some "Chilling" Problems in the
Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEo. L.J. 1313, 1352 (1986). Pro-
fessor Nelken warns that the Rule does not give judges complete freedom and discretion
to reform the entire adversary system. The Rule should provide a more specific stan-
dard for judges to use when imposing sanctions in order to insure vigorous, non-frivo-
lous advocacy. Id. at 1353.
4. C. SHAFFER & P. SANDLER, SANCTIONS: RULE 11 AND OTHER POWERS 1-2 (2d
ed. 1988). While the Rule was not expected to resolve all the problems with our litiga-
tion system, the authors unfortunately note that there is no evidence that it has helped
to reduce the number of frivolous lawsuit filings at all. Id. at 2.
5. Judicial Conference Solicits Comments on Rule 11 Revisions, ABA/BNA Law.
Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 278 (Aug. 19, 1990) (the Committee noted over
1000 reported decisions applying the amended Rule 11 in contrast to the 11 decisions
applying the preamendement Rule).
6. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447 (1990) (the Court resolved
three issues that created conflicts among the federal appellate circuits and settled the
debate over the Rule's central purpose); Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment
Group, 493 U.S. 120 - (1989) (the Court held that just the attorney who signs the
pleading, motion or paper-and not her law firm-is individually responsible for the
contents and liable for Rule 11 sanctions); Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Commu-
nications Enters., Inc., 111 S. Ct. 922 (1991) (the Court extended the imposition of the
objective standard of reasonable inquiry to represented parties who, either voluntarily
or by mandate, sign pleadings or papers); see also infra notes 72-122 and accompanying
text for in-depth discussions of Pavelic & LeFlore, Cooter & Gell, and Business Guides.
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ture.7 Although the Court's decisions resolved certain conflicts as to
the Rule's purpose and relationship to other procedural rules, many
questions remain.8 Several commentators believe that it is time to
either reamend the Rule or discard it altogether. 9
This Recent Development discusses the past, present and uncertain
future of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. Part II explains the his-
tory of Rule 11 before and after the 1983 amendment. Part III ana-
lyzes the Rule 11 issues that create the most circuit court conflicts.
Part IV discusses the Rule's present status in light of two recent
Supreme Court decisions and current lower court trends. Finally, Part
V considers the impact of these decisions and trends on the future of
the Rule.
II. HISTORY OF RULE 11
A. Original Rule 11
Historically, an attorney's signature on a pleading was proof that the
party sought legal assistance before filing suit 0 Legal minds subse-
quently interpreted a lawyer's signature to represent a personal guaran-
tee that the pleading was well-founded.11 This interpretation became
the touchstone for Rule 11.12
7. Coyle, Rule 11 Imbroglio Rages On, Nat'l L.J., June 25, 1990, at 1, col. 1. The
author notes that scholars and experts foresee that the Court can expect to face many
more cases in the future as the debate over the controversial Rule continues.
8. Coyle, supra note 7, at 1, col. 1 (referring to statements made by Gregory P.
Joseph, a Rule 11 expert). Although the Pavelic & LeFlore decision focused on a nar-
row issue, the Cooter & Gell decision resolved three issues of widespread concern which
could result in significant, long-term ramifications. Id. at 27.
9. See, e.g., Joseph, Redrafting Rule 11, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 1, 1990, Podium Section, at
13, col. 1. The author acknowledges that if the Rule is not abolished, it should at least
be amended, for example to restore a judge's discretion to impose sanctions. Id.
10. Nelken, supra note 3, at 1315 (originally, the signature guaranteed nothing
about the grounds on which the complaint was based). For a thorough discussion of the
history of the signature requirement, see Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and Its Enforce-
ment: Some "Striking" Problems with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L.
REV. 1 (1976).
11. Risinger, supra note 10, at 9-13. In his 1838 treatise on equity pleadings,
Supreme Court Justice Story articulated that an attorney's signature was an avouch-
ment of good ground. His view, included in the original draft of Rule 11, inextricably
linked the signature requirement to the well-founded pleading requirement.
12. Nelken, supra note 3, at 1315. Justice Story's vision was incorporated into Rule
24 of the Equity Rules of 1842 and 1912. The Advisory Committee, in turn, based the
language of Rule 11 on the Equity Rules. Id.
1991]
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Adopted in 1938, the original version of Rule 11 required that every
pleading signed by an attorney or party have a sound factual and legal
basis. 13 The Rule authorized a court to strike the pleading if the attor-
ney signed it intending to defeat the purpose of the Rule and to impose
appropriate disciplinary action against the lawyer who willfully vio-
lated the Rule.14
In practice, however, the Rule ineffectively remedied the abuses for
which it was adopted. 5 While it concentrated on the attorney's con-
duct, its enforcement provisions often harshly affected the client.' 6
Finding it difficult to determine when the attorney acted in subjective
bad faith, courts rarely struck pleadings or invoked appropriate disci-
plinary actions in the years prior to the Rule's amendment.17
Uncertain as to what conduct triggered the Rule, courts imposed
Rule 11 sanctions only eleven times during its first forty-five years of
existence. 8 Absent blatant violations, judges reluctantly disciplined
attorneys.' 9 Due to the Rule's relative inVisibility, it became a prime
13. See supra note I for text of Rule 11 including the preamendment language; see
also Nelken, supra note 3, at 1314-15. By signing a pleading, a lawyer allegedly certified
that there was "'good ground to support [the pleading]' and that it was not interposed
for delay." Id. (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 11). For a thorough discussion of the origins
of Rule 11, the judicial power to award attorney's fees, the original Rule 11 in practice
and the author's perceived deficiencies in the original version, see generally Comment,
The Horizon of Rule 11: Toward a Guided Approach to Sanctions, 26 Hous. L. REV.
535-43 (1989).
14. See supra note 1 for text of the original Rule.
15. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules [hereinafter Com-
mittee Notes]. See also 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 3, for a detailed discus-
sion of the effectiveness of the original Rule 11.
16. Nelken, supra note 3, at 1315. If the court determined that the lawyer willfully
violated the Rule by signing a sham pleading, it would strike the pleading. Unfortu-
nately, as a result, clients were penalized for making a poor choice in hiring an attorney.
Id. See also Comment, supra note 13, at 541 (noting that the Rule's non-use stemmed
in part from the fact that the only explicitly authorized penalty was to strike the
pleadings).
17. See Nelken, supra note 3, at 1315; Comment, supra note 13, at 541.
18. Risinger, supra note 10, at 34-37. The author explains that since its adoption in
1938, parties have brought only 19 genuine Rule 11 motions. None appeared until after
1950 and over half after 1971. Of these, courts found violations in only 11 of the cases,
but subsequently disposed of four on other grounds, imposed no disciplinary action in
two, invoked alternative sanctions in three and reversed one on appeal. Only one case
finally succeeded. Id.
19. See Survey Project, Attorney Sanctions: Rule 11, 3 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 71,
74 (1989) (because the Rule offered little guidance in formulating appropriate sanctions,
courts imposed such measures only where extreme, subjectively bad faith cases arose).
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candidate for amendment.'
B. The 1983 Amendment
The 1983 amendment to Rule 11 changed the language of the Rule's
certification requirement and significantly altered its enforcement pro-
visions.21 The drafter's decision to force the legal profession to finally
notice the Rule created an impact almost as great as the amendment
itself.22 The new Rule's primary purpose was to streamline the litiga-
tion process by deterring dilatory or abusive tactics and decreasing
frivolous filings.2 3
The Committee replaced the original good-ground certification re-
quirement with the more stringent reasonable inquiry standard.24 The
attorney's duty to investigate the facts and law prior to filing became
20. Nelken, supra note 3, at 1316 (to deter attorneys from using tactics which disre-
garded the "social costs of litigation," the Advisory Committee amended the Rule to
give meaning to its sanctions and to set stricter standards).
21. Id. at 1318-25 (discussing in-depth the changes made in the Rule's certification
and enforcement provisions). See also supra note 1 for the text of the amended version
of Rule 11. See generally G. JOSEPH, SANCIMONS: THE FEDERAL LAW OF LrnGATION
ABUSE (1989 & Supp. 1990) (citing the most recent case law, the author provides a
general overview of the laws governing the litigation process); Barton, Rule 11 Sanc-
tions, 63 CONN. B.J. 63 (1989) (discussing the different approaches to sanctions under
amended Rule 11); Remsburg & Gaer, General Overview of Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 11, DRAKE L. REv. 261 (1989) (an exhaustive and detailed analysis of the require-
ments of the language of Rule 11); Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189
(1988) (presenting an in-depth and technical interpretation of the practices and
problems under Rule 11).
22. Nelken, supra note 3, at 1318 (citing Miller & Culp, Litigation Costs, Delay
Prompted the New Rules of Civil Procedure, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 28, 1983, at 24, col. 1
("[Tlhe revision of Rules 7 and 11 is as much a psychological exercise to get the atten-
tion of the bench and the bar as it is to make a significant change in their content.").
23. See Committee Notes, supra note 15 (the Committee called upon district courts
to pay greater attention to pleading and motion abuses and to impose sanctions when
appropriate).
24. Nelken, supra note 3, at 1319 ("[A] lawyer's failure to make the required in-
quiry will result in sanctions, regardless of her subjective good faith."). See also Sanc-
tions, supra note 2, at 186-97. Judge Schwarzer proposes that the new certification
requirement consist of three overlapping prongs: (1) its factual basis; (2) its legal basis;
and (3) its legitimate purpose. As to the factual obligation, the attorney must certify
that he has read the paper and believes, after reasonable inquiry, that it is well grounded
in fact. Id. at 186. Tl~e second factor involves the lawyer's duty to act as a zealous
advocate, but does not reduce her concurrent duty to only advance a claim or defense
based on existing law or a good faith argtqment for its extension, modification or rever-
sal. Id. at 189. Finally, to satisfy the third prong, a lawyer must not interpose papers
only to harass or cause unnecessary delay or other improper purposes. Id. at 195.
19911
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explicitly affirmative.25 The Committee expected this change to dra-
matically increase the number of reported Rule 11 violations.26 The
new Rule removed the willful violation restriction and proposed in-
stead to prohibit filing for any improper purpose.27 Courts now impose
sanctions for a wide variety of conduct, including bad faith procedural
moves.
2 8
The Rule's second major change involved its enforcement provi-
sions.29 Sanctions under the amended Rule 11 are mandatory.3 As
judges reluctantly imposed sanctions due to sympathy, pressure or un-
certainty, the new Rule removed a judge's discretion to deny sanc-
tions.31 Courts gained flexibility, however, in choosing the appropriate
25. See Committee Notes, supra note 15, which read in pertinent part:
The words "good ground to support" the pleading in the original Rule were
interpreted to have both factual and legal elements. They have been replaced by a
standard of conduct that is more focused.
The new language stresses the need for some prefiling inquiry into both the facts
and the law to satisfy the affirmative duty imposed by the Rule. The standard is
one of reasonableness under the circumstances.
Id. (citations omitted).
26. Id. See also Nelken, supra note 3, at 1322 (expectations also included discour-
aging the courts from overlooking or minimizing sanctions).
27. But see Committee Notes, supra note 15. "However, in considering the nature
and severity of the sanctions to be imposed, the court should take account of the state of
the attorney's or party's actual or presumed knowledge when the pleading or other
paper was signed." Id.
28. See Coburn Optical Indus., Inc. v. Cilco, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 656 (M.D.N.C.
1985) (sanctions warranted for making a motion to dismiss for improper venue when
venue was proper and the factual basis for venue was readily ascertainable); Cannon v.
Loyola Univ., 609 F. Supp. 1010 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (sanctions imposed for bringing an
action clearly barred by res judicata), aff'd, 784 F.2d 777 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1033 (1987); Hochalter v. Century 21 Hallmark, No. 84C7924 (N.D. I11. Feb.
13, 1985) (sanctions imposed for failing to meet the amount in controversy requirement
for diversity jurisdiction); Thompson v. Midland Prods., No. 83C7469 (N.D. Ill. Jan.
20, 1984) (sanctions imposed for naming the wrong defendant as a result of inadequate
prefiling investigation).
29. See Committee Notes, supra note 15 ("[T]he text of the amended Rule seeks to
dispel apprehensions that efforts to obtain enforcement will be fruitless by insuring that
the Rule will be applied when properly invoked."); see also Nelken, supra note 3, at
1321-23 (noting that the court should not be limited to just striking pleadings).
30. See Sanctions, supra note 2, at 200. Judge Schwarzer predicts that courts will
not feel bound to impose sanctions under the amended Rule, however, as the discretion
to tailor sanctions according to the gravity of the facts at issue is still a critical factor.
d.
31. Nelken, supra note 3, at 1321-22 (noting that the drafter's purpose in making
sanctions mandatory was to "discourage any collegial inclination to overlook or mini-
mize violations ... [and] to maximize the deterrent effect of sanctions").
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sanctions to apply.32 The language of the Rule provides that courts
shall award reasonable costs and attorney's fees incurred because of the
violation.33 At their discretion, courts may fashion other sanctions de-
pending upon the particular circumstances and choose who bears the
responsibility for the sanctions according to the relative degree of
liability.3 4
Although commentators disagree as to the new Rule's function-
whether the purpose of sanctions is compensatory, or punitive-its
message is clear.35 Objectivity is the guidepost.3 6 If the litigant and
counsel go forward with a pleading or legal argument that is objec-
tively frivolous, Rule 11 can take its toll.37 At the very least, lawyers
must stop and think, or pay the consequences.38 The Rule is not with-
out faults, however. Over the years, the clear concepts underlying
amended Rule 11 blurred as a result of inconsistent court use and
32. Id. at 1322. See also FED. R. Civ. P. 11 and Committee Notes, supra note 15
("The detection and punishment of a violation of the signing requirement, encouraged
by the amended Rule, is part of the court's responsibility for securing the system's effec-
tive operation.").
33. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
34. See Committee Notes, supra note 15 (courts can impose sanctions on the attor-
ney, the party represented by the signing attorney, or both, or even a party unrepre-
sented by counsel but who signs the pleading); see also Untereiner, A Uniform Approach
to Rule 11 Sanctions, 97 YALE L.J. 901, 916-20 (1988) (proposing an analytical frame-
work for understanding who should be sanctioned and what sanctions are proper).
35, See Nelken, supra note 3, at 1323-25. Professor Nelken reports that Professor
Miller, Reporter to the Civil Rules Advisory Committee, asserts that sanctions should
be looked at economically, as a type of cost-shifting technique. Id. at 1323 (citing A.
MILLER, THE AUGUST 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PRO-
CEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGEMENT AND LAWYER RESPONSIBIL-
rY 18-19 (1984)). In the alternative, Judge Schwarzer advises that sanctions be deemed
punishment, requiring judges to take corrective measures in order to deter and repri-
mand current or future offenders. Id. at 1324 (citing Schwarzer, Managing Civil Litiga-
tion: The Trial Judge's Role, 61 JUDICATURE 400 (1978)).
36. See Survey Project, supra note 19, at 75 (given that the language of the amend-
ment mandates particular affirmative obligations, objectivity is appropriate in consider-
ing Rule 11 violations).
37. See, e.g., Zola v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. 84 Civ. 8522
(S.D.N.Y. May 28, 1985) (court again warned the plaintiff of its willingness to use Rule
11 after ruling that his complaint was insufficient); Laterza v. American Broadcasting
Co., 581 F. Supp. 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (court warned that it would entertain a motion
for Rule I 1 sanctions if plaintiff did not adequately amend his utterly insufficient com-
plaint); Lancaster v. Thompson, No. 82C5548 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 15, 1983) (court called
the attorney's attention to Rule 11 when it dismissed the complaint for failing to allege
supporting facts).
38. See A. MILLER, supra note 35, at 15.
1991]
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application.39
III. IssuEs IN CONFLICT UNDER AMENDED RULE 11
Despite an occasional definitive circuit court ruling, application of
Rule 11 continues to spark controversy.' Although the new objective
standard is clearly advantageous over the former subjective approach,
it creates confusion when applied inconsistently."' Critics blame these
inconsistencies on the unavoidable fact that judges apply Rule 11 dif-
ferently.42 As courts subject the elements of Rule 11 violations to vari-
ous interpretations, they inevitably undermine its effectiveness.43
One common issue confronting lower courts is the meaning of a rea-
sonable factual and legal inquiry.' Courts generally take an ad hoc
approach when determining whether a reasonable factual inquiry has
occurred.45 The standard asserted by the Advisory Committee is rea-
39. For a circuit by circuit analysis of Rule lI's application, see generally C. SHAP-
PER & P. SANDLER, supra note 4.
40. Id. at 8 (noting that only two years after its amendment, commentators stated
that studies already had shown that courts needed more clearly articulated and inter-
nally consistent guidelines for ruling on Rule 11 violations).
41. Id. See also S. BURBANK, RULF, 11 IN TRANSITION, THE REPORT OF THE
THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11, at 3
(1989) (whatever benefits are derived from amended Rule 11 are offset by the increased
costs of the sanctioning procedures, otherwise known as satellite litigation).
42. C. SHAFFER & P. SANDLER, supra note 4, at 8-9. The result is referred to as
"interjudge disagreement." This phenomenon occurs because trial judges, given great
latitude in determining whether a violation has occurred, often have varying ideas about
exactly what degree of frivolousness justifies awarding sanctions. Id. at 9.
43. Id. at 8-9. The inconsistent application of the purportedly "objective" standard
is almost as detrimental as the old subjective approach. Id. Attorneys simply learn
how the courts will rule in this particular jurisdiction and connivingly fashion their
pleadings accordingly. Id. Thus, the Rule's purpose of deterring frivolous lawsuits is
circumvented.
44. Id. at 3 (clearly "a minimal factual inquiry and a cursory legal investigation"
can cause a court to impose sanctions (citing Cleveland Demolition Co. v. Azcon Scrap
Corp., 827 F.2d 984 (4th Cir. 1987))). See generally Note, Plausible Pleadings: Devel-
oping Standards for Rule 11 Sanctions, 100 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1987).
45. Vairo, supra note 21, at 218. Relying solely on the word of co-counsel or a
client, sloppy investigatory work or outright deception are all grounds for the imposi-
tion of sanctions. Id. Compare Cabell v. Petty, 810 F.2d 463, 467 (4th Cir. 1987)
(Butzner, J., dissenting) (arguing that the\level of factual inquiry considered reasonable
under the circumstances should be determined by carefully weighing all of the mitigat-
ing factors at the time of the filing) and Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1279 (2d
Cir. 1986) (noting that it would be improper to require plaintiffs and counsel to plead
facts before commencing suit that could only be obtained through the discovery pro-
cess), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 918 (1987) with Skycom Corp. v. Telstar Corp., 813 F.2d
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sonableness under the circumstances.46 Factors to be considered in-
clude: (1) How much time the signer had to investigate the facts
underlying the complaint; (2) whether he had to rely exclusively on his
client for the factual information surrounding the cause of action; and
(3) whether the attorney was experienced in the particular type of
matter.47
The standard for reasonable legal inquiry evokes divergent con-
cerns.4" The Rule's chief criticism is its chilling effect on creative ad-
vocacy.4 9 Courts reluctantly impose Rule 11 sanctions where parties
810 (7th Cir. 1987) (the court remanded the case to the district court for a determina-
tion of appropriate sanctions when it found that the attorneys had either not inquired or
intentionally misrepresented facts of which they had knowledge); Unioil, Inc. v. E.F.
Hutton & Co., 809 F.2d 548, 558 (9th Cir. 1986) (in one of the largest sanction award
cases in the Ninth Circuit, the court rejected counsel's reliance argument and stated
that when a lawyer signs a pleading he then "cannot simply delegate to forwarding co-
counsel his duty of reasonable inquiry"), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 822 (1987); Brown v.
National Bd. of Medical Examiners, 800 F.2d 168, 173 (7th Cir. 1986) (plaintiff's attor-
ney sanctioned for filing a factually baseless motion which alleged that defendants had
behaved in an inappropriate manner); and World v. Minerals Eng'g Co., 575 F. Supp.
166, 167 (D. Colo. 1983) (defendant's lawyers sanctioned for failing to reasonably inves-
tigate the truth of their pleadings upon learning information which disaffirmed the facts
as they knew them).
46. See Committee Notes, supra note 15 ("[T]he Rule is not intended to chill an
attorney's enthusiasm or creativity in pursuing factual or legal theories... but [t]he
court is expected to avoid using the wisdom of hindsight and should test the signer's
conduct by inquiring what was reasonable to believe at the time the pleading, motion or
other paper was submitted.").
47. Id. The Rule, however, does not require a party or an attorney to reveal privi-
leged communications or work product to prove that his signature is sufficiently justi-
fied. See also Unioil, Inc. v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 809 F.2d (9th Cir. 1986) (attorney
receiving a case from forwarding counsel must at least speak to the client; furthermore,
an attorney experienced in certain areas of complex litigation should be subjected to a
higher standard than a general practitioner), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 822 (1987); Southern
Leasing Partners, Ltd. v. McMullan, 801 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. 1986) (attorney sanctioned
for purposely eschewing other modes of investigation and, instead, relying solely on
client interviews); O'Rourke v. City of Norman, 640 F. Supp. 1451 (W.D. Okla. 1986)
(attorney sanctioned for making no inquiries other than discussing the case with the
client during the year and a half between the time the action occurred and the date he
filed the complaint).
48. See Remsburg & Gear, supra note 21, at 276-77. The pertinent factors include:
(1) Whether a credible legal theory supported the pleading, motion or other paper; (2)
the extent to which the lawyer's actions hinged in any way on another member of the
legal community; (3) the complexity of the legal matters at issue; and (4) the amount of
time available to the signer to research the relevant legal issues.
49. Nelken, Has the Chancellor Shot Himself in the Foot? Looking for a Middle
Ground on Rule 11 Sanctions, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 383, 393-94, 404-05 (1990) (specifically
the chilling effect is most evident in civil rights cases where the Rule unduly burdens the
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attempt to stretch at least arguably relevant legal theories.50 Judges
take special care when confronted with cases of first impression or
those involving undetermined or confusing areas of law. 1 Courts hesi-
tate less when the lack of legal basis is fairly obvious and the absence of
good faith readily apparent.5 2
Another related issue is whether Rule 11 imposes a continuing obli-
gation on the attorney to evaluate the reasonableness of pleadings pre-
viously filed.53 Commentators in favor of a continuing obligation
congressional policies in favor of such suits). See, e.g., In re Kunstler, No. 89-2815 (4th
Cir. Sept. 18, 1990) (the court voided the $123,000 sanction award but agreed that some
sanctions were due because the attorney had filed the harassment suit on behalf of an
Indian-rights group for the sake of publically humiliating and embarrassing certain gov-
emnment officials); Blue v. United States Dep't of the Army, No. 88-1364 (4th Cir. Sept.
18, 1990) (a court affirmed sanctions levied on the director of NAACP Legal Defense
Fund for filing a suit based on unsubstantiated allegations of widespread discrimina-
tion); Thornton v. Wahl, 787 F.2d 1151 (7th Cir.) (court affirmed imposition of sanc-
tions on attorney for making untrue statements of law and on his client for pursuing
spurious litigation), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 851 (1986).
50. Vairo, supra note 21, at 214-15. See Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp.,
823 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1987) (the court addressed the problem of distinguishing be-
tween sanctionable, meritless claims and those that are not); see also Indianapolis Colts
v. Mayor of Baltimore, 775 F.2d 177, 181-82 (7th Cir. 1985) (refusal to impose sanc-
tions affirmed where the complaint was, from an objective point of view, based on rea-
sonable legal arguments).
51. See, eg., Van Dorm Co. v. Howington, 623 F. Supp. 1548 (N.D. Ohio 1985)
(court refused to impose sanctions against a plaintiff in a RICO case due to unsettled
law and an unusual factual setting).
52. Vairo, supra note 21, at 215. Some cases are not so obvious, however. In
Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986), rev'g
103 F.R.D. 124 (N.D. Cal. 1984), for example, the Ninth Circuit reversed sanctions
imposed on defense counsel whose summary judgment arguments were legally and fac-
tually supportable, but who presented arguments for the extension of law as if they were
existing law. Id. at 1539. See also Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. Group Sys. Int'l Far
East, 109 F.R.D. 594 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (attorney ordered to pay sanctions where he
failed to research Supreme Court cases on particular issue); National Survival Game,
Inc. v. Skirmish, U.S.A., Inc., 603 F. Supp. 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (defendants sanctioned
for utterly disregarding precedents which, although well known, were unfavorable).
53. See C. SHAFFER & P. SANDLER, supra note 4, at 9-10. The authors discuss
several Rule 11 cases concerning this issue. See Robinson v. National Cash Register
Co., 808 F.2d 1119, 1127 (5th Cir. 1987) (The court initially stated that "[u]pon discov-
ering that a good faith basis no longer exists [for a pleading], it is incumbent upon the
appropriate counsel and party to take necessary actions to ensure that the proceedings
do not continue without a reasonable basis in law and fact."); Pantry Queen Foods, Inc.
v. Lifschultz Fast Freight, Inc., 809 F.2d 451, 454 (7th Cir. 1987) (although ongoing
revisions are not required, the Rule does implicitly obligate a party to update its plead-
ings because the Rule applies to all papers filed in the litigation); Oliveri v. Thompson,
803 F.2d 1265, 1275 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that the signer's conduct must be judged as
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argue that such a view is consistent with the stream-lining purpose of
Rule 1 L" They insist that a claim which becomes frivolous after it is
filed is just as burdensome as one that was frivolous when fled. 5 The
opposition suggests that no support for the extension of the reasonable
inquiry requirement exists.56 They base their conclusion on the Rule's
express call for some prefiling inquiry and its silence as to a continuing
obligation. 7
Another disputed issue is whether the Rule's "improper purpose"
clause is independent from the "well-grounded in fact and warranted
by existing law" clause.5" Although the Rule primarily calls for objec-
tive analysis, the improper purpose clause necessarily requires subjec-
tive inspections.5 9 The circuits are split as to whether the improper
purpose component can be violated-a subjective determination-even
after concluding that the pleading is objectively reasonable. 60
Another issue debated among the circuits involves the nature and
function of sanctions.61 The Rule's language refers to an "appropri-
ate" sanction.62 Courts find it difficult to determine whether to view
of the time the signature was affixed and, therefore no Rule 11 violation exists where an
attorney failed to withdraw a complaint that later proved to be groundless), cert. de-
nied, 480 U.S. 918 (1987). The Fifth Circuit later reconsidered and rejected this theory
in Thorns v. Capital Sec. Serv., Inc., 836 F.2d 866 (5th Cir. 1988), where it noted that
"[1]ike a snapshot, Rule 11 review focuses upon the instant when the picture is taken-
when the signature is placed on the document." Id. at 874.
54. See Comment, supra note 13, at 550-51 (a continuing obligation forces parties to
clarify issues based on discovery information, thus eliminating frivolous litigation at an
early stage).
55. Id. (citing Note, The Dynamics of Rule 11: Preventing Frivolous Litigation by
Demanding Professional Responsibility, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 300, 325-26 (1986)).
56. Id. (both the Rule's language and the Advisory Committee's Notes support this
contention).
57. See supra note I for text of FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
58. C. SHAFFER & P. SANDLER, supra note 4, at 10-11 ("[T]he language of the Rule
.. turns on whether the pleading, motion or other paper was interposed to harass the
opposing party or to cause unnecessary delay or needless expense... [n]o matter how
objective the [n]ew Rule is, determination of 'improper purpose'. . . necessarily involves
subjective intent.").
59. Id.
60. Id. The authors note that while the Fifth Circuit holds that the clauses are to be
evaluated independently, the Ninth Circuit recognizes that, even though the clauses are
independent, where a complaint is found to be well grounded in fact and law it cannot
be sanctioned as harassing, regardless of the attorney's subjective intent. Id.
61. See Comment, supra note 13, at 552-54. See generally C. SHAFFER & P. SAN-
DLER, supra note 4 for an overview of how each circuit handles this issue.
62. See supra note I for text of Rule 11.
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sanctions as compensation or punishment.63 Unfortunately, neither
approach alone satisfies the ultimate goals of Rule 11. 64
The punitive approach easily invites abuse unless courts carefully
tailor sanctions to individual violations.65 Alternatively, the compen-
satory approach either results in an insufficient deterrent effect or fails
to alleviate the harm caused by the violation.66 The mandatory nature
of sanctions, although under criticism as well, at least ensures that
courts will continue to impose sanctions even if they disagree as to
their proper function.67
On a procedural level, disputed issues include whether the prevailing
attorney in a Rule 11 decision has a duty to mitigate the amount of fees
that the sanctioned party or attorney will have to pay.68 Courts also
disagree as to whether they may impose Rule 11 sanctions for a frivo-
lous argument in a non-frivolous motion.69 Finally, debates continue
as to whether it is proper for a lower court to impose sanctions for a
complaint filed in state court and removed to federal court.70 In light
of these circuit court conflicts, it was not surprising when the Supreme
Court, last term, granted review of its first Rule 11 cases.
63. See, eg., Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 821 F.2d 121 (2d Cir.)
(court basically imposed a "slap on the wrist" sanction where it ordered the sanctioned
attorney to pay $10,000 in fees, even though the lodestar figure was over $50,000), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987); see also supra note 35 and accoinpanying text for a discus-
sion of two commentators' views on the function of sanctions.
64. See Comment, supra note 13, at 554.
65. Id. By failing to tailor the sanction, courts run the risk of exceeding the Rule's
deterrent effect. Id.
66. Id. The compensatory approach will only have a deterrent effect if the costs
incurred due to the tactic used outweigh the benefit bestowed upon the party who used
it. Nelken, supra note 3, at 1325.
67. Comment, supra note 13, at 551. Those opposed to mandatory sanctions argue
that courts often ignore the Advisory Committee's recommendations to carefully con-
sider each Rule 11 violation. Id.
68. C. SHAFFER & P. SANDLER, supra note 4, at 12 (recognizing a duty to use the
most inexpensive approach in notifying the court of a Rule 11 violation (citing United
Food & Commercial Workers Union Local No. 115 v. Armour & Co., 106 F.R.D. 345
(N.D. Cal. 1985))).
69. Id. at 13 (the Ninth Circuit decisions on this issue best illustrate the dispute).
See, eg., Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir.
1986) (Rule 11 does not authorize sanctions where one unjustified legal argument exists
in an otherwise non-frivolous motion).
70. C. SHAFFER & P. SANDLER, supra note 4, at 11. As Rule 11 cannot apply to
state court pleadings, several circuits hold that it cannot apply to removed state court
pleadings. Id.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol40/iss1/13
FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 11
IV. THE RULE'S CURRENT STATUS
A. The Supreme Court Decisions
As stated above, circuit courts continually debate many aspects of
Rule 11. Speaking for the first time on amended Rule 11 last term, the
Supreme Court resolved several particularly controversial issues.7" In
the first case, Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group,72 the
Court determined whether a lawyer or his law firm should be sanc-
tioned for a Rule 11 violation.
73
The sanction in Pavelic & LeFlore arose from an amended complaint
in a copyright infringement action.74 The plaintiff claimed that his
name had been forged on several key documents relied on by the de-
fendants to counter his claim of infringement. 5 When he was unable
to substantiate that claim at trial, the district court awarded $100,000
in sanctions under Rule 11 76
While the amended complaint was signed only by the plaintiff's at-
torney, subsequent papers relevant to the forgery allegations were
signed by the attorney and indicated his affilfation with a subsequently
formed partnership.77 The district court ordered that the firm pay half
of the sanctions.78 Writing for an eight-member majority, Justice
71. See infra notes 72-122 and accompanying text for detailed discussion of cases.
72. 493 U.S. 120 (1989).
73. Id. at -, l10 S. Ct. at 460. For a detailed discussion of the case, see also Case
Comment, Rule ): A Matter of Individual Responsibility: A Case Analysis of Pavelic &
LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 110 S. Ct. 456 (1989), 13 HAMLINE L. Ray.
373 (1990).
74. Pavelic & LeFlore, 110 S. Ct. at 457. The original complaint alleged that the
plaintiff developed an idea for a motion picture and wrote a script, and that respondents
had begun to develop this work without his permission. Respondents motioned to dis-
miss, asserting that certain documents attached to the complaint evidenced their right
to develop the work commercially. Id.
75. Id. Following the district court's dismissal of the original complaint for failure
to specify the registration number of the copyright and the dates upon which the alleged
acts of infringement had occurred, plaintiffs filed the amended complaint which in-
cluded the forgery allegation. Id.
76. Id. The court based this award on the grounds that the forgery claim had no
factual basis and had not been investigated sufficiently by counsel. Id.
77. Id. In October 1984, after the plaintiff's attorney, Ray LeFlore, had signed the
amended complaint, he joined with Radovan Pavelic to form the law partnership of
Pavelic & LeFlore. Id.
78. Id. at 458. Pavelic immediately moved to relieve the firm of the sanction, argu-
ing that the firm should not be responsible for the violations as it did not exist during a
major portion of the litigation and because Rule 11 did not give the court authority to
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Scalia explained that Rule 11 does not permit the district court to im-
pose a sanction against the signer's law firm, even if the pleadings
which violated the Rule were signed by the lawyer on behalf of his law
firm. The opinion stressed that the Rule's primary purpose was to
assure that the signing attorney carries out his individual responsibility
to verify the paper, not just to reimburse the opposing party.80 Critics
claim that the Court simply applied the text of the Rule without at-
tempting to improve upon it.81
The Supreme Court's second Rule 11 case was Cooter & Gell v.
Hartmarx Corp. 2 In Cooter & Gell, the Court was asked to resolve
three issues: (1) whether a voluntary dismissal under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(i) ends the case and the trial court's authority
to impose Rule 11 sanctions; (2) what standard of review should an
appellate court use when determining the appropriateness of a trial
court's imposition of Rule 11 sanctions; and (3) whether a penalized
attorney may face additional sanctions for bringing a losing appeal of
the initial sanctions.8 3
The underlying lawsuit involved a class action against a leading
manufacturer of men's suits on antitrust grounds.8 4 The defendants
impose sanctions upon a law firm. Id. at 457-58. The district court agreed that half of
the sanction should be shifted from the firm to LeFlore but disagreed that a court could
not sanction a law firm. Calloway v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 650 F. Supp. 684,
687 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). The Second Circuit affirmed, Calloway v. Marvel Entertainment
Group, 854 F.2d 1452, 1479 (1988), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Pavelic & LeFlore
v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 110 S. Ct. 456 (1989) thereby creating a direct conflict
with a previous Fifth Circuit holding in Robinson v. National Cash Register Co., 808
F.2d 1119, 1128-30 (1987). Pavelic & LeFlore, 110 S. Ct. at 458.
79. Pavelic & LeFlore, 110 S. Ct. at 460. The Court focused on the provision in the
text of Rule 11 that requires a court, when a paper is signed in violation of the Rule, to
"impose upon the person who signed it . .. an appropriate sanction." Id. at 458.
Although seemingly ambiguous, when read in the total context of all the provisions of
the Rule, the phrase "person who signed it" must mean the same individual signer
mentioned at the outset of the Rule. Id. at 458-59.
80. Id. at 460. Arguably, the purpose is better served by making the signer person-
ally responsible. Id.
81. See Coyle & Strasser, Court Eases Firm Worries on Rule 11 Sanctions, Nat'l
L.J., Dec. 18, 1989, at 5 (noting that Rule 11 expert,Gregory Joseph, observed that
although the ruling in Pavelic & LeFlore was correct, it would not prove helpful in
determining how the Court will rule on future Rule 11 cases).
82. 110 S. Ct. 2447 (1990).
83. Cooter & Gell, 110 S. Ct. at 2447.
84. Id. The plaintiff, a discount clothier, alleged a nationwide conspiracy on the
part of the manufacturer and its subsidiaries to fix prices and eliminate competition. Id.
at 2448.
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moved to dismiss the antitrust complaint and for sanctions under Rule
11.L Several months later, the district court granted the plaintiff's law
firm's motion for a voluntary dismissal of the class action. 86 Three
years passed before the court finally granted the defendant's motion for
Rule 11 sanctions on the ground that the plaintiff's prefiling inquiry
was grossly inadequate.87
The District of Columbia Circuit affirmed, rejecting the argument
that voluntary dismissal divests the district court of jurisdiction to
award Rule 11 sanctions.8" Justice O'Connor, writing the opinion for
the United States Supreme Court agreed on this first point.89 She ex-
plained that Rule 11 sanctions involve a collateral issue that the district
court may address even after dismissing the suit.9" She warned that
the plaintiff's right to one free dismissal under Rule 41 does not secure
the right to file baseless papers.9
Noting the compatibility of Rules 11 and 41(a)(1)(i), Justice
O'Connor reasoned that because a Rule 11 sanction does not signify a
district court's assessment of the complaint's legal merits, imposing a
sanction after a voluntary dismissal does not deprive a plaintiff of his
right under Rule 41(a) to dismiss an action without prejudice. 92 The
Court further noted that the Rule would be an ineffective deterrent
against baseless filings if a party could escape its Rule 11 violation
85. Id. At this time, the plaintiff filed three affidavits setting forth the prefiding
research, essentially consisting of telephone inquiries, that supported the allegations in
the complaint. Id.
86. Id. Before the dismissal became effective, the district court heard oral argu-
ments on the Rule 11 motion and took it under advisement. Id. at 2449.
87. Id. The court found that the allegations were completely baseless and imposed
a sanction of $21,452.52 against the plaintiff's attorney and $10,701.26 against the
plaintiff. Id.
88. Id. The court reasoned that Rule 11's punishment and deterrent functions
would only be furthered if courts could sanction parties, notwithstanding their efforts to
cut their losses by running out of court. Id. at 2450.
89. Id. at 2454. Justice O'Connor held that this view is more consistent with the
majority of the circuits which have ruled on this issue. Id.
90. Id. at 2455. Justice O'Connor illustrated this remark by pointing out that
courts may award costs after an action is dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Id.
91. Id. at 2456-57. Justice O'Connor noted that attorneys who file complaints, pa-
pers, or other motions paying careful attention to their preparation are committing a
separate abuse of the litigation process and are, therefore, subject to separate sanction.
Id.
92. Id. at 2455-56. Justice O'Connor noted that such an interpretation is consistent
with the goals of Rule 41(a)(l)-to curb abuses of the nonsuit Rules-which is strik-
ingly similar to Rule 11 's purpose. Id. at 2456-57.
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merely by dismissing the case.
9 3
Justice O'Connor then turned to the appropriate standard of review
issue.9 4 A majority of the circuits agreed to use the deferential stan-
dard in reviewing a district court's findings of fact and sanction selec-
tions.95 The narrow issue involved whether a court of appeals must
defer to a district court's legal conclusions in Rule 11 proceedings.9 6
Justice O'Connor concluded that an abuse-of-discretion standard
should govern all aspects of a district court's Rule 11 determination.9 7
She noted that the trial court, familiar with the issues and litigants, is
better situated than an appellate court to determine the relevant facts,
apply the legal standards, and draw the legal conclusions mandated by
Rule 11.98
On the final issue involving the award of attorney's fees incurred on
appeal, the Court held that Rule 11 applies only to district court fil-
ings.9 9 This holding cleared up another area of disagreement among
the circuits."°° The Court stated that interpreting the last sentence of
Rule 11 as extending the scope of the sanction to cover any expenses,
including fees on appeal incurred "because of the filing," would be
overbroad, o
Justice O'Connor noted that, logically, only those expenses directly
93. Id. at 2457.
94. Id. at 2458. Justice O'Connor first explained that determining a Rule 11 viola-
tion involves the consideration of three distinct issues: factual questions, legal findings,
and the appropriateness of the sanctions. Id.
95. Id. at 2459. Justice O'Connor cites to cases from the First, Third, Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals in support of the deferential
standard of review as to all Rule 11 issues. Id.
96. Id. at 2460. In support of applying the deferential standard to legal conclusions,
the Court noted the long history of difficulty courts have endured when trying to distin-
guish between legal and factual issues and how this, determination is made even more
difficult in Rule 11 cases. Id. at 2460-61.
97. Id. at 2464.
98. Id. at 2461. Justice O'Connor likened this reasoning to negligence cases, which
are generally reviewed deferentially. Id.
99. Id. at 2468. The Court reasoned that in order not to discourage meritorious
appeals, Rule 1l's scope should be limited in this manner. Id. at 2467.
100. Id. at 2465. The First and Seventh Circuits had held that attorney's fees in-
curred in defending an award on appeal were reimbursable, whereas the Fourth and
Ninth Circuits held to the contrary. Id.
101. Id. The Court explained that this line of reasoning would extend indefinitely
the possibility of incurring expenses "because of" a baseless filing. Id.
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caused by the filing-those at the trial level-may be awarded.1" 2 She
explained that fees on appeal are governed by the frivolous appeal stan-
dard of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38. 'o Further, Justice
O'Connor advised that Rule 38 and Rule 11 be read together as al-
lowing expenses incurred on appeal to be shifted to appellants only if
those expenses are caused by a frivolous appeal, and not merely be-
cause a Rule 11 sanction upheld on appeal ultimately can be traced to a
baseless filing in district court."14
Rule 11 commentators disagree on which of the Court's three rul-
ings in Cooter & Gell will have the greatest impact.105 While some
think the decision will be very helpful in providing lower courts more
uniformity of interpretation, others feel that it will further the Rule's
chilling effect on litigation.1"6
The third Rule 11 case to reach the Supreme Court was Business
Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enterprises, Inc. 107 In
Business Guides, the Court decided whether Rule 11 imposed the same
objective standard of reasonable inquiry on represented parties who
sign papers as it imposed on attorneys.108 The majority opinion, au-
thored once again by Justice O'Connor, answered in the affirmative.109
Business Guides involved a copyright infringement suit brought by a
business directory publisher against one of its competitors. 1 The
plaintiff, along with its counsel, signed an application for a temporary
102. Id. at 2466.
103. Id. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 states, "If a court of appeals shall
determine that an appeal is frivolous, it may award just damages and single or double
costs to the appellee." FED. R. App. P. 38.
104. Cooter & Gell, 110 S. Ct. at 2467. The Court explained that because Rule 11 is
not a fee-shifting statute, the same policies that allow courts to award attorney's fees to
the prevailing party on appeal do not apply to appeals of Rule 11 sanctions. Id. at 2468.
105. See Coyle, supra note 7, at 27.
106. Id. Some critics believe courts already have too much discretion to punish a
lawyer's misconduct and, thus, feel that now courts will surely overstep their bounds.
Id.
107. 111 S. Ct. 922 (1991).
108. Business Guides, 111 S. Ct. at 931.
109. Id. at 933.
110. Id. at 925. Business Guides, Inc. alleged that Chromatic Communications En-
terprises, Inc. had published a competing trade directory using pieces of false informa-
tion copied from Business Guides' directory known as "seeds." Business Guides
asserted that Chromatic had used 10 of these "seeds" which it specifically inserts in an
effort to protect against other competitiors copying its directories. Id.
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restraining order (TRO).11' At the hearing on the TRO, the district
court easily determined that the application was based on faulty infor-
mation and, thus, denied it." 2 The court found the plaintiff and its
counsel in violation of Rule 11, sanctioned the company and dismissed
the complaint.1 1
3
In its 5-4 decision, the Court affirmed the order of sanctions against
the plaintiff by addressing three issues. 114 First, Justice O'Connor de-
termined that the text of Rule 11 clearly implies its application to rep-
resented parties, not just attorneys and unrepresented parties.1 15
Secondly, the Court stated that an objective certification standard-
one of reasonableness under the circumstances-should apply to the
represented parties who sign motions, pleadings or other papers. 1 6
Lastly, the court held that sanctioning a represented party, not acting
in bad faith, did not violate the Rules Enabling Act.'17
Justice O'Connor examined each sentence of the Rule in determining
that the lower courts holdings were consistent with the plain language
and purpose of Rule 11.'8 She agreed that the Rule does not distin-
guish between the standard of inquiry that applies to attorneys as op-
111. Id. The application, supported by affidavits prepared by Business Guides, set
forth the portions of the directory which had been copied but did not specifically point
to the seed in each listing. Id.
112. Id. at 925-26. The district court discovered that nine of the 10 "seeds" actu-
ally contained correct information and, thus, were, in fact, not seeds. Id.
113. Id. at 926-27. At the hearings to determine whether Rule I 1 sanctions should
be imposed, the court found that Business Guides had failed to conduct a proper pre-
filing inquiry into the accuracy of their allegations and invited Chromatic to file a mo-
tion for sanctions. The sanctions motion against Business Guides' counsel was later
withdrawn as the law firm had recently gone bankrupt. Business Guides', however, was
sanctioned $13,000, Chromatics legal expenses and out-of-pocket costs. Id,
114. Id. at 923-25.
115. Id. at 928-31. Justice O'Connor noted that "[h]ad the Advisory Committee
intended to limit the application of the certification standard to parties proceeding pro
se, they would surely have said so." Id. at 930.
116. Id. at 931-33. Business Guides' argued that the court should apply a subjective
bad faith standard to represented parties. The Court, however, pointed out that the
plain language of the rule "draws no distinction between the state of mind of attorneys
and parties." The Rule merely refers to the "signer." Id. at 932.
117. Id. at 933-35. Justice O'Connor wrote that although imposing monetary sanc-
tions for Rule 11 violations confers benefits on other parties, "such incidental effects"
do not abridge, modify or enlarge anyone's substantive rights in violation of 20 U.S.C.
§ 2072 (1988). Id. at 933.
118. Id. at 928-31. The opinion focuses primarily on sentence five of the rule which
refers to the signature of the attorney or party as a certificate that the pleading or paper
is well grounded in fact. Id at 929 (construing FED.'R. Civ. P. 11).
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posed to parties.119 The fact that a party chooses to sign a pleading,
even if represented by counsel, imposes upon it a duty to conduct an
adequate pre-filing inquiry into the merits or be held accountable. 2 °
The Court expressly did not decide what standard, if any, to apply to a
non-signing party. 2 '
The dissent in Business Guides noted that the majority's interpreta-
tion of the Rule created a new duty, one that only Congress should
create.' 2 2 Perhaps this statement foreshadows the realization that the
legislature's involvement is overdue. The Court surely recognizes that
many of the controversies brewing in the circuits may wind up on its
dockets.
B. The Current Trends
Although the Supreme Court resolved five major Rule 11 issues,
many others remain. In the lower courts, several of the conflicts men-
tioned above continue to surface. The Seventh Circuit recently reaf-
firmed its position that Rule 11 does not impose a continuing
obligation on lawyers to review pleadings and other papers after filing
to make sure they still have factual and legal support.12 A Penn-
sylvania district court also recently held that the Supreme Court's vol-
untary dismissal ruling in Cooter & Gell applies to a sanctions motion
that is not filed until after the court voluntarily dismisses the complaint
under Rule 41(a)(2). 12 4
119. Id. at 932. Justice O'Connor explained that to allow a more lenient standard
for represented parties under which sanctions would only lie if there was a finding of
subjective bad faith, would establish a "safe harbor" whereby sanctions would not be
imposed except upon the attorney, who "pressed to act quickly, reasonably relies on a
client's careless misrepresentation." Id. at 933.
120. Id. The Court stated that the first sentence of the Rule does not require a
represented party to sign pleadings and other papers and, thus, likewise, does not pro-
hibit such a party from attesting to the underlying bases of the complaint filed by its
attorneys. Id. at 929.
121. Id. at 935.
122. Id. at 940 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The dissent, written by Justice Kennedy,
disagreed as to the standard to apply to represented parties. The opinion further de-
clared that the majority's holding created a "new tort of negligent prosecution or acci-
dental abuse of process." Justice Kennedy expressed concern that the majority was
overstepping its bounds as a rule-making authority. Id. at 941-42.
123. Samuels v. Wilder, 906 F.2d 272, 275 (7th Cir. 1990) (reversing a sanction the
district court has imposed on plaintiffs' lawyers who did not immediately dismiss their
client's complaint once discovery showed it was groundless).
124. Cambridge Prods., Ltd. v. Penn Nutrients, Inc., 131 F.R.D. 464,466 (E.D. Pa.
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Finally, the Ninth Circuit recently joined the majority of circuits in
holding that the inclusion of one frivolous claim in an otherwise meri-
torious complaint or counterclaim, or the frivolous inclusion of one
defendant among others properly included as parties, is sanction-
able.125 Following in other circuits' footsteps, the court effectively dis-
carded the "frivolous as a whole" test. 126
Other newly established Rule 11 trends involve the imposition of
sanctions. In addition to levying enormous and unprecedented mone-
tary sanctions upon attorneys,127 courts are also imposing unusual
non-monetary sanctions. For instance, the Fifth Circuit recently or-
dered an attorney to read and brief the facts and law of the cases cited
in its rulings, to do so on the attorney's own time during nights and
holidays or days off, and to deliver a letter-perfect brief to the judge's
chambers by a specified date. 121
In light of these current court cases and trends, the Advisory Com-
mittee on Civil Rules is considering whether the time has come to re-
vise the Rule.129 The Committee solicited comments from interested
lawyers regarding the amended Rule 11 and held hearings in February
and April of 1991.130 The Committee's concerns include whether the
cost of satellite litigation has exceeded its benefits, whether there is evi-
dence that sanctions have been administered unfairly, whether the size
of sanctions is getting out of hand, and whether the Rule is being used
to intimidate weaker parties.' Rule 11 experts believe that a re-evalu-
1990) (noting that because the harm occurs upon the filing of the baseless complaint, it
is irrelevant in what manner the court voluntarily dismisses the complaint).
125. Townsend v. Holman Consulting Corp., 914 F.2d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 1990)(en banc) (cautioning that the fact that the pleading is frivolous as a whole will no
longer be treated as a safe harbor that insulates lawyers from sanctions).
126. Id.
127. A federal district court in Illinois recently levied a sanction of $351,664.96
against a contractor's attorney in a failed action against a construction management
firm accused of violating RICO. Brandt v. Schal Assocs., Inc., 131 F.R.D. 485, 503
(N.D. Ill. 1990).
128. The Fifth Circuit imposed the innovative sanction on an attorney who submit-
ted several motions that were not supported in fact or in law, and that were filed to
delay the trial for which the attorney was unprepared. Henderson v. Department of
Pub. Safety & Corrections, 901 F.2d 1288 (5th Cir. 1990). Interestingly, the attorney
did not protest the form of the sanction.
129. See Judicial Conference Solicits Comments on Rule 11 Revisions, supra note 5,
at 278.
130. Id.
131. Id. Other concerns include: (1) Whether the amendments have served their
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ation of the Rule is both timely and necessary. 132
V. ANALYSIS
The 1983 amendment to Rule 11 introduced an objective standard
and authorized mandatory sanctions. 133 As a result of these changes,
the Rule's use increased dramatically.13 1 Unfortunately, this increase
brought with it inconsistent application and enforcement. 135 The Ad-
visory Committee's call for comments arguably indicates that the Rule
is on its way out. In the alternative, the Committee's action might
suggest it recognizes the need to revise the Rule.
The definitive manner in which the Supreme Court ruled on its first
three Rule 11 cases implies that it, too, recognizes the exigency of abat-
ing the circuit court controversies. 136 It would be overly burdensome,
if not impossible, for the Court to rule on all the Rule 11 issues men-
tioned above. As is evident from the recent trends, the legal commu-
nity cannot rely upon the lower courts to remedy the situation.137 New
disagreements inevitably replace the old.
For Rule 11 to survive, the Advisory Committee must reamend it.
The amendments should focus on reducing the burden of satellite liti-
gation, minimizing the Rule's chilling effect and providing the lower
courts with more uniform guidelines for applying the Rule. 138 Revi-
sion suggestions might include restoring discretionary sanctions, mak-
ing sanctions awardable only upon motion, replacing the objective
standard with something stricter, and redrafting the Rule to reduce its
aims in discouraging the Rule's misuse; (2) the extent to which there is incremental
injury to the civility of the adversary process due to lawyers accusing one another of
Rule 11 violations; and (3) whether sanctions have been unfairly administered to any
particular group of attorneys or parties. Id. at 278-79.
132. See Joseph, supra note 9, at 13.
133. See supra notes 21-39 and accompanying text for discussion of the 1983
amendment.
134. See supra notes 17 & 28 and accompanying text for a discussion of pre-amend-
ment and post-amendment Rule use.
135. See supra notes 40-70 and accompanying text for an analysis of issues in
conflict.
136. See supra notes 71-122 and accompanying text for discussion of Pavelic & Le-
Flore, Cooter & Gell, and Business Guides.
137. See supra notes 123-32 and accompanying text for analysis of recent trends.
138. See Nelken, supra note 49, at 405-08; Comment, supra note 13, at 570-73 (both
authors propose amendments to the Rule).
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intrusiveness into the attorney-client relationship.139 The Advisory
Committee must attempt to incorporate such changes without sup-
pressing the Rule's goal.
VI. CONCLUSION
Since its 1983 amendment, courts have applied Rule 11 both ener-
getically and disparately. 1" The Rule's potential to deter frivolous liti-
gation is underscored only by its susceptibility to abuse. Perhaps the
Advisory Committee is experiencing a proverbial "seven year itch."
After careful review, the Committee may decide to discard Rule 11.
The better alternative is to substantially revise the Rule. Although re-
ferred to as a necessary evil, the Rule plays an indispensable role in the
continuing effort to improve our adversary system.
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139. For discussion in support of the revisions, see Joseph, supra note 9.
140. See supra notes 40-70 and accompanying text.
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